Statement–Argument — Should Chief Ministers have a say in judicial appointments? Arguments: I) Yes; completely excluding the executive by vesting appointment power solely in the Chief Justice of India (with or without a collegium) risks undermining public accountability and balance among branches. II) Yes; if the Central Government has primacy regarding the Chief Justice of India, parity suggests State Governments should have a say in appointments of Chief Justices of High Courts. Choose the strong argument(s).
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Aif only argument I is strong
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Bif only argument II is strong
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Cif either I or II is strong
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Dif neither I nor II is strong
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ENone of these
Answer
Correct Answer: if only argument I is strong
Explanation
Introduction / Context:This statement–argument item tests constitutional reasoning about separation of powers and checks and balances. The question is not about a specific legal scheme but about whether giving Chief Ministers a say enhances governance and judicial independence, or threatens it.
Given Data / Assumptions:
- Judicial appointments must balance independence with democratic accountability.
- The executive (Union or State) represents elected authority; the judiciary safeguards rights and adjudicates government action.
- Absolute exclusion of any branch can create legitimacy or capture risks.
Concept / Approach:A strong argument will (a) address public interest, (b) avoid absolute or purely analogical claims, and (c) consider institutional design trade-offs. We test each argument on these grounds.
Step-by-Step Solution:
Assess I: It cautions against total exclusion of the executive, pointing to balance and accountability. This is policy-relevant and grounded in constitutional design concerns. → Strong.Assess II: It relies on parity/analogy: if the Centre has primacy for CJI, States should have primacy for High Courts. But analogical parity alone does not prove desirability; different levels may warrant different designs, and “if Centre does X then State must do Y” is not intrinsically a public-interest justification. → Weaker.Verification / Alternative check:Comparative systems often include mixed mechanisms (judicial commissions including executive and judicial members) to reduce unilateral control, which supports the thrust of I: balance without domination.
Why Other Options Are Wrong:“Only II” elevates analogy over substance; “Either” incorrectly treats II as independently strong; “Neither” ignores I’s constitutional rationale.
Common Pitfalls:Confusing symmetry (parity) with sound policy; assuming more actors automatically means better outcomes without safeguards.
Final Answer:if only argument I is strong.