Statement–Argument — Should Chief Ministers have a say in judicial appointments? Arguments: I) Yes; completely excluding the executive by vesting appointment power solely in the Chief Justice of India (with or without a collegium) risks undermining public accountability and balance among branches. II) Yes; if the Central Government has primacy regarding the Chief Justice of India, parity suggests State Governments should have a say in appointments of Chief Justices of High Courts. Choose the strong argument(s).

Introduction / Context:
This statement–argument item tests constitutional reasoning about separation of powers and checks and balances. The question is not about a specific legal scheme but about whether giving Chief Ministers a say enhances governance and judicial independence, or threatens it.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Judicial appointments must balance independence with democratic accountability.
• The executive (Union or State) represents elected authority; the judiciary safeguards rights and adjudicates government action.
• Absolute exclusion of any branch can create legitimacy or capture risks.

Concept / Approach:
A strong argument will (a) address public interest, (b) avoid absolute or purely analogical claims, and (c) consider institutional design trade-offs. We test each argument on these grounds.

Step-by-Step Solution:

Verification / Alternative check:
Comparative systems often include mixed mechanisms (judicial commissions including executive and judicial members) to reduce unilateral control, which supports the thrust of I: balance without domination.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
“Only II” elevates analogy over substance; “Either” incorrectly treats II as independently strong; “Neither” ignores I’s constitutional rationale.

Common Pitfalls:
Confusing symmetry (parity) with sound policy; assuming more actors automatically means better outcomes without safeguards.

Final Answer:
if only argument I is strong.