Statement–Assumption (Telephone Penalty Notice for Late Bill Payment): Statement: The telephone company notified subscribers that those who do not pay by the due date will be charged a penalty for every defaulting day. Assumptions: I) A majority will pay by the due date to avoid the penalty. II) The money collected as penalty will offset losses due to delayed payments. III) People generally pay heed to such notices.

Introduction / Context:
This administrative notice is a behavioural intervention. Its logic depends on subscribers learning about the policy and changing their payment timing to avoid extra cost.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Policy: per-day penalty after due date.
• Objective: reduce payment delays.

Concept / Approach:
Two things are necessary: awareness (people read or heed the notice) and behavioural response (enough subscribers advance their payments to avoid penalties). Whether penalty revenue mathematically “offsets losses” is a separate finance question and not required for policy rationale.

Step-by-Step Solution:
I: The company assumes the penalty will deter late payment—i.e., many will pay on time to avoid it. Implicit.II: Exact offset of losses is unnecessary; deterrence is sufficient. Not implicit.III: Communication must be effective—people must read or heed the notice. Implicit.

Verification / Alternative check:
Even if penalties do not fully cover carrying costs, improved timeliness improves cash flow and lowers arrears risk; thus II is not necessary.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
Choices including II add an unneeded cost-recovery premise; “None” denies the obvious communication and deterrence assumptions.

Common Pitfalls:
Equating a deterrent policy’s success with revenue maximisation from penalties; ignoring the role of notice in behaviour change.

Final Answer:
I and III are implicit.