Statement–Assumption (Penalty for Late Electricity Bill Payments): Statement: The electricity company announced via notice: consumers who do not pay their bills by the due date will be charged a penalty for every day of default. Assumptions: I) Money collected as penalty will compensate losses caused by delayed payments. II) People generally read such notices. III) A majority will pay by the due date to avoid the penalty.

Introduction / Context:
Announcing a penalty is a behavioural nudge to improve on-time payments. The core assumptions relate to information reaching consumers and altering their incentives—not necessarily to full financial compensation for delays.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Notice threatens per-day penalty after due date.
• Goal: increase timely payments, reduce arrears.

Concept / Approach:
For the notice to be effective, (a) consumers must read it, and (b) enough consumers must change behaviour to avoid the penalty. Whether penalty revenue exactly offsets carrying-cost losses is not essential to justify the policy; deterrence can be sufficient.

Step-by-Step Solution:
I: Compensation of losses is a possible side-effect but not necessary; even if penalties don’t fully compensate, deterrence still improves cash flow. Not implicit.II: Communication reach is necessary—if no one reads the notice, the deterrent fails. Implicit.III: The intended behavioural response (more on-time payers) must be presumed for the policy to be worthwhile. Implicit.

Verification / Alternative check:
Nudge policies assume awareness and elastic behaviour to costs. Revenue-neutrality is not a prerequisite.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
Including I overstates the financial aim; “All/None/Only II” misclassify the dual necessity of visibility and behavioural response.

Common Pitfalls:
Confusing deterrent design with revenue-maximisation; overlooking the information channel.

Final Answer:
II and III are implicit.