Statement–Argument — Should the Government keep other oil PSUs out of the HPCL disinvestment? Arguments: I. Yes. This will prevent the diversion of precious PSU funds into potentially unproductive expenditure. II. No. Allowing PSU bidders may intensify competition and yield higher bids than private players.

Introduction / Context:
Disinvestment design commonly weighs fiscal efficiency against public-sector circularity. The choice is whether to exclude other oil PSUs from bidding for HPCL.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• I: Concern that PSU-to-PSU transactions merely reshuffle public funds, risking inefficient capital allocation.
• II: Competition among capable bidders (including PSUs) can raise price discovery and maximise proceeds.

Concept / Approach:
Both arguments target core objectives—efficient use of public capital (I) and competitive price realisation (II). They are mutually opposed in policy stance but each is relevant and non-trivial, leading to the canonical “either” evaluation.

Step-by-Step Solution:
1) I is strong: exclusion can avoid intra-state asset shuffling and maintain fiscal discipline.2) II is strong: broader bidder pools often improve valuation outcomes.3) Because they cannot be simultaneously adopted, the correct assessment is “either I or II is strong.”

Verification / Alternative check:
Some programmes explicitly allow PSU participation with safeguards; others restrict to private bidders to avoid circularity—evidence of both logics in practice.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
“Only I/II” ignores the alternative valid objective; “both” suggests simultaneous adoption despite contradiction; “neither” undervalues both.

Common Pitfalls:
Overlooking hybrid solutions (e.g., caps, strategic rationale tests) that try to reconcile aims.

Final Answer:
If either I or II is strong.