Statement–Argument — Should the constitutional provision allowing premature dissolution of a state assembly be amended? Arguments: I. Yes. The power has sometimes been used by ruling governments to serve partisan interests rather than constitutional necessity. II. No. Premature dissolution can be essential to fulfil constitutional obligations when stable governance is impossible.

Introduction / Context:
Constitutional design must balance preventing misuse with retaining tools to resolve deadlock or loss of majority.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• The dissolution power can be abused for partisan advantage.
• Genuine breakdowns of governance sometimes require early polls.
• Amendment options include stricter triggers, review, and safeguards.

Concept / Approach:
Both arguments raise valid, policy-level concerns: preventing misuse (I) and preserving necessary flexibility (II). Each is independently persuasive depending on institutional safeguards chosen.

Step-by-Step Solution:
1) I: Points to documented misuse; amending to add checks can protect constitutional morality—strong.2) II: Notes that eliminating or over-constraining the power may paralyse responses to genuine crises—also strong.3) Because both positions are legitimate and hinge on design choices, either can be strong.

Verification / Alternative check:
Comparative constitutions use confidence tests, judicial review, or super-majority triggers to reconcile these aims.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
“Only I/Only II/Both/Neither” fail to capture the genuine trade-off.

Common Pitfalls:
Framing the question as abolition vs status quo rather than guardrails vs flexibility.

Final Answer:
If either I or II is strong.