Statement–Argument — Should the educated, unemployed youth be paid an “unemployment allowance” by the Government? Arguments: I. Yes. It will provide short-term monetary support to search for jobs or to kick-start self-employment. II. No. It may dampen the urgency to seek work and can promote idleness among some beneficiaries.

Introduction / Context:
Statement–argument items assess whether the given reasons are relevant, significant, and policy-grade. The proposal is to pay an unemployment allowance to educated, unemployed youth; we weigh the strength of both a supporting and an opposing argument.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Allowance offers temporary income for job search or seed capital for micro-ventures.
• Opponents fear moral hazard and reduced job-seeking intensity.
• No specifics on duration, targeting, conditionality, or funding are provided.

Concept / Approach:
A strong argument identifies a real, generalizable policy consideration. It need not be conclusive; it must be pertinent and non-trivial. Public programs often balance welfare protection against incentive effects.

Step-by-Step Solution:
1) Argument I speaks to cushioning frictions in labor markets and enabling search/entrepreneurship. This is a legitimate welfare-efficiency rationale. Strong.2) Argument II warns about idleness or dependency if design lacks conditionality (e.g., active job search requirements, time limits). This incentive concern is also material. Strong.3) Because both highlight core, competing considerations, both are strong.

Verification / Alternative check:
Countries frequently use time-bound, conditional support to retain incentives—acknowledging both arguments as relevant.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
Picking only one ignores either welfare/entrepreneurship benefits or incentive risks; “neither” undervalues clear policy relevance.

Common Pitfalls:
Assuming benefits or harms without considering program design (targeting, duration, conditionality).

Final Answer:
If both I and II are strong.