Statement: Should the law ministry institute a corrective mechanism to hold judges with “deviant behavior” more accountable? Arguments: I. Yes. A formal mechanism would check sagging standards and strengthen judicial accountability. II. No. Such a mechanism cannot succeed unless the executive collaborates with the judiciary. Select the option that best identifies the strong argument(s).

Introduction / Context:Accountability mechanisms in the judiciary should be assessed on their capacity to improve standards without compromising independence. Strong arguments provide a direct, principled justification.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Policy: introduce corrective mechanism for deviant judicial behavior.
• Strength test: relevance to accountability, feasibility in principle.

Concept / Approach:Argument I directly links the mechanism to improved standards and accountability—central to the proposal. Argument II claims failure without executive collaboration; this is not an argument against instituting the mechanism per se but about implementation conditions, and it neither shows inherent harm nor reasons to reject the policy outright.

Step-by-Step Solution:• I: Policy-aligned (accountability, standards) ⇒ strong.• II: Conditional feasibility claim that does not negate desirability; as framed, it is not a decisive reason to oppose ⇒ weak.

Verification / Alternative check:Even if collaboration is beneficial, it supplements rather than replaces the need for a mechanism.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:Including II mistakes an implementation caveat for a policy-negating reason.

Common Pitfalls:Confusing “needs collaboration” with “should not exist.”

Final Answer:Only argument I is strong.