Statement: Should the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) be brought under the direct control of the Cabinet Secretariat? Arguments: I. Yes. This would reduce partiality and make the CBI more meaningful and purposeful. II. No. It would empower the prime minister to harass coalition leaders who do not support him on issues. Select the option that best identifies the strong argument(s).

Introduction / Context:
We evaluate structural control of an investigative agency. Strong arguments should focus on institutional integrity and accountability, not speculative political misuse without mechanism-based reasoning.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Agency: CBI; proposed overseer: Cabinet Secretariat.
• Strength criterion: relevance to impartiality, transparency, accountability.
• Speculation without structural linkage is weak.

Concept / Approach:
Argument I connects the control change to reduced partiality—an institutional objective—hence directly relevant. Argument II alleges harassment by the prime minister; this is a slippery-slope claim without explaining why Cabinet Secretariat oversight necessarily increases arbitrary control relative to existing checks.

Step-by-Step Solution:
• Assess I: Addresses neutrality and purpose—core to the decision ⇒ strong.• Assess II: Asserts potential abuse but offers no structural explanation (e.g., absence of judicial/legislative oversight), remaining conjectural ⇒ weak.

Verification / Alternative check:
If II had cited lack of checks, due-process erosion, or concentration of power metrics, it could be stronger. As framed, it is a generic fear.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
Options including II treat conjecture as evidence; “either/none” ignore the substantive institutional rationale in I.

Common Pitfalls:
Accepting political apprehension without institutional analysis as a strong argument.

Final Answer:
Only argument I is strong.