Statement–Assumption — Mr. X says: “Human rights are only for human beings, not for terrorists. Protesting for those found guilty of terrorism insults human rights.” Assumptions: I. Terrorists do not deserve sympathy. II. Acts of terrorism are against humanity.

Introduction / Context:
The speaker draws a harsh boundary: those convicted of terrorism do not merit human-rights advocacy. This stance rests on moral judgments about terrorism and those who commit it.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• The statement concerns those “found guilty,” i.e., convicted terrorists.
• It labels support for them as an “insult” to human rights.

Concept / Approach:
For the conclusion to follow, (I) the speaker must believe terrorists do not deserve sympathy or rights-claims—otherwise protesting on their behalf would not be objectionable. Also, (II) the acts themselves are seen as affronts to humanity; if terrorism were not against humanity, the clash with “human rights” would be incoherent. Together, these premises justify the statement’s strong normative rejection.

Step-by-Step Solution:
1) Without I (no sympathy), labeling advocacy as an “insult” would be inconsistent.2) Without II (terrorism against humanity), the linkage between terrorism and renunciation of human-rights claims collapses.

Verification / Alternative check:
Public discourse often predicates denial of moral standing on the belief that the underlying acts violate basic human values.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
“Only I” lacks the foundational evaluation of terrorism; “Only II” lacks the stance on sympathy; “either” under-supports; “neither” contradicts the rhetoric.

Common Pitfalls:
Missing that the statement embeds both a devaluation of perpetrators and a condemnation of the act.

Final Answer:
if both I and II is implicit.