Statement: Should people convicted of heinous crimes like murder or rape (beyond all reasonable doubt) be given the death penalty? Arguments: I. No. Death penalty should be reserved only for the rarest of rare cases. II. Yes. It is the only way to adequately punish such offenders. III. Yes. Severe punishments deter such crimes and make society safer. IV. No. Truly repentant offenders should get a chance at reform and a normal life. Choose the option that best identifies the strong argument(s).

Introduction / Context:
The debate balances retributive justice and deterrence against proportionality and the possibility of reform. The statement asks about awarding death penalty (in general) for heinous crimes proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Given Data / Assumptions:

• Heinous crimes impose extreme harm and societal fear.
• Legal systems set high thresholds (“rarest of rare”) and due process safeguards.
• Deterrence evidence is contested but often cited as a rationale.

Concept / Approach:
We test whether each argument bears on justification under established penological aims—retribution, deterrence, and societal protection—versus open-ended mercy claims.

Step-by-Step Solution:
I: Narrows use to exceptional cases; it argues against a generalized stance, but the prompt is broad and does not specify universality. As framed, I does not decisively address the general question. Weak.II: Asserts retribution (“only way”)—captures the moral gravity many legal systems recognize for heinous crimes. Strong as a retributive rationale.III: Cites deterrence and public safety—a classic penological objective. Though empirical certainty varies, it remains a policy-grounded argument. Strong.IV: Rehabilitation for the repentant is valid in general, but for the most heinous crimes post-conviction mercy is typically considered via commutation/clemency, not as a rule against the penalty itself. Weak in this evaluative framing.

Verification / Alternative check:
Sentencing frameworks often combine II/III, tempered by judicial discretion; hence II and III present the core policy justifications.

Why Other Options Are Wrong:
Including I or IV overstates their force against general authorization; “Only III” omits retribution; “All” treats the weaker claims as equal.

Common Pitfalls:
Conflating existence of penalty with its discretionary application.

Final Answer:
Only II and III are strong